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APPLIED STATISTICS: A REVIEW
By D. R. Cox
Nuffield College, Oxford
The main phases of applied statistical work are discussed in gen-
eral terms. The account starts with the clarification of objectives and
proceeds through study design, measurement and analysis to inter-
pretation. An attempt is made to extract some general notions.
1. Introduction. The extremely welcome founding of the Annals of Ap-
plied Statistics prompts the question: what are the central principles of ap-
plied statistics? The great variety of the fields in which statistical considera-
tions play some part makes it hazardous to attempt an answer. Any simple
recommendation along the lines in applications one should do so and so is
virtually bound to be wrong in some or, indeed, possibly many contexts. On
the other hand, descent into a yawning abyss of vacuous generalities is all
too possible.
The following comments are relevant mostly to applications in the natu-
ral and social sciences and the associated technologies, including medicine
and health, although not confined to particular fields. I am broadly very
sympathetic to the idea that success often hinges more on scientific sense
than on technical mastery of complex methods; see, for example, Chatfield
(1995). The literature of our field is, however, inevitably dominated by de-
tailed issues of methodology. Some of the points that follow are expressed
in rather different form by Cox and Snell (1980), Part I.
One general issue is the desirability of an intimate union between subject-
matter and statistical aspects of an investigation. This theme runs implicitly
throughout much of the following discussion. In the formulation of objectives
and in discussions of design the need is quite clear. In analysis of data there
can be tensions. At one extreme, in subjects such as those parts of physics
with a strong theory base, it would be foolish to use statistical models not
directly consistent with that base. On the other hand, in other fields there
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may be firmly held views, enshrined in tradition, that are both inconsistent
with the particular data under analysis and in actual fact not well established
by evidence. Another possibility is that the pioneering subject-matter paper
in a field may have used a statistical method which, while adequate at the
time, is not good for general use. There may be considerable pressure within
the field to use the inferior method. In the former case, there is a clash
between superficial subject-matter concerns and the ultimately empirical
aethos of statistics and indeed, of science, which by and large respects the
primacy of empirical information. In the latter case persistent comparison
of older and newer methods may produce change.
In those parts of statistical analysis based on explicit probability mod-
els, the principle of sufficiency in a sense helps release some of the tension.
Sufficiency divides the data into two components. The sufficient statistic
itself summarizes information assuming the model to be essentially correct,
whereas the rest of the data, taken conditionally on the sufficient statis-
tic, allows model criticism and development. There are exceptions where
the model is saturated with parameters, as for example in some forms of
two-level factorial experiment. Then no information is available for model
development; such models are occasionally very fruitful but their use is man-
ifestly hazardous.
In analyses that are purely descriptive or are based on algorithmically
specified methods [Breiman (2001)], the broad principle should be the same;
the data typically provide some information about the appropriateness of
the description or algorithm and this aspect should be examined, even if
only informally. It is interesting and perhaps surprising that J. W. Tukey,
who had an extraordinarily wide-ranging knowledge of the natural sciences
down to fine detail, favored largely ignoring that knowledge in the main
phases of analysis, introducing it only in the final stages of interpretation
[Tukey (1975 approx), personal communication].
2. Formulation of objectives. While settling the objectives of an analy-
sis is initially a subject-matter concern, sometimes an important and indeed
crucial role of statistics is in clarifying what reasonably can and cannot be
investigated with a given body of data, data either already available or pro-
jected. Alternatively, what extraneous assumptions will be needed in addi-
tion to the data in order to address some specific issue? Efron [(1998), Section
4.4], has remarked that while frequentist formulations of analysis are typi-
cally best suited for careful assessment of the strength of evidence, Bayesian
formulations may allow the insertion of additional information which may
open the route to bolder speculation, sometimes providing an alternative to
sensitivity analysis.
A conventional division of objectives is between decision-making and in-
ference, the latter in the sense of gaining understanding and assessment of
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evidence. While many investigations, including, in particular, most that one
would regard as technological in some very broad sense, have a decision-
making ultimate objective, this is by no means the same as requiring an
automatic decision-rule that will dictate the decision once the data are avail-
able. Major decisions typically require review of the evidence and discussion
of its strengths and weaknesses, much as in a formal inference problem. From
this perspective the theoretical representation of all statistical methods as
being concerned with decision-making is seriously flawed.
Problems of decision-making in the narrower sense are, in principle, most
satisfactorily treated, where possible, in a fully Bayesian setting, that is,
by inverse probability with an evidence-based prior and a specified utility
function. There are, however, a number of strategical issues connected with
applications. Suppose that the decision rule is used repeatedly. How is its
performance to be checked and possibly updated and improved, formally
possible within a limited setting by some version of Kalman filtering? Also,
can the whole formalization be checked in an analogue of model criticism?
At the formalization stage is it better to go straight for good empirical
performance or is this better preceded by an attempt at a deeper analysis?
A key issue for decision procedures intended for broad application is sta-
bility under systematic changes of environment of application and over time.
Even relatively complicated methods of cross-validation rarely address this
satisfactorily. The concern with meaningful stability underlies also some of
the issues of analysis outlined below.
Where the objective is not immediate decision-making but the improve-
ment of understanding, research questions of various levels of ambitiousness
are possible. At one level a fruitful objective may be the concise description
of patterns of variability, perhaps by a formal model, perhaps by a series
of graphs, tables and summarizing statistics. Interpretation is then left to
informal arguments. Some applications of spectral analysis are of this kind.
A more specific example concerns the description of spatial-temporal rainfall
fields. Meteorological knowledge of storm types may be in the background
but perhaps not explicitly modeled.
The most challenging research objectives concern the probing of data-
generating processes with a view to enhanced understanding and to studying
causality in one of the senses of that word; for a discussion of various views of
statistical causality, see Cox and Wermuth [(1996), Section 8.7 and (2004)].
The fairly recent surge of interest in causality in statistical work has been
very fruitful. The interventionist, counterfactual or potential outcomes for-
mulation, emphasized in work stemming from Rubin (1974), is undoubtedly
valuable in many fields of application, not least in clarifying which variables
are to be regarded as potentially causal and in helping focus objectives. In
the natural sciences the word causal tends to be used sparingly and, when
it is used, means something like having an evidence-based interpretation in
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terms of an underlying process. Similar views have been suggested in so-
ciology [Goldthorpe (2007)] and in demography [Ni Bhrolcha´in and Dyson
(2007)]. The latter authors, having developed a set of guidelines very sim-
ilar to but rather more comprehensive than those of Bradford Hill (1965),
widely quoted in epidemiology, suggest that three of the guidelines are es-
sential. These are time ordering, evidence of mechanism and uniqueness of
interpretation. Important as is the notion of causality, claims of having es-
tablished it, in particular, from single observational studies, should be made
with caution, in particular in those fields where there may be strong public
policy or health implications.
Even in complex investigations, an ideal situation is that study objec-
tives are specified by a series of focused research questions (or sometimes
hypotheses). Often a focused question can initially or eventually be formu-
lated by a one-dimensional parameter, implying that in statistical theory
some emphasis should be placed on one-dimensional parameters of interest.
In an older statistical tradition this was represented by the goal of break-
ing sums of squares of main interest in an analysis of variance table into
single orthogonal degrees of freedom. The orthogonality now seems a rather
secondary aspect but the one-dimensionality, if achievable, is important.
Even though the broad qualitative objectives of an investigation may be
clear, nevertheless precise formulation of research questions may require con-
siderable discussion. Interplay between subject-matter and statistical con-
siderations may be crucial. Indeed, in some contexts it may be at this stage
that statistical arguments are of most importance.
3. Study design. Next consider design. It is a truism that the design of
a study, of whatever kind, is crucial. A seriously defective design may be
incapable of rescue even by the most ingenious of analyses; a good design
may lead to conclusions so clear that simple analyses are enough. Design
issues range from the specific choice of material where the investigation in-
volves secondary analysis of already collected data, through the various kinds
of observational study to experiments, especially randomized experiments,
where the investigator may have close to total control over the system un-
der investigation. The possibility of mixtures of various types of study is
important.
Objectives of design are essentially the same whatever the type of study,
namely, to address the research questions so far as feasible free of bias,
and with modest random error of estimation, as usually best assessed by
a standard error, a width of confidence interval or posterior distribution.
Note that initial assessment of precision is simpler by specifying a target
standard error than by an essentially equivalent specification of power. The
standard error emphasizes estimation rather than significance testing and
power, unlike standard error, is of little direct relevance for analysis.
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These aims are to be achieved with reasonable economy of resources.
The general principles for doing all this are firmly established. The central
challenge in virtually all instances is to adapt these principles to take account
of practical constraints that are inevitably present. Simplicity is important.
In particular, it is not helpful to identify statistical design of experiments
with the use of combinatorially complex structures.
An important issue in design of all kinds involving relatively complicated
situations not easily or quickly replicable is to consider the various patterns
of outcome that may arise and to check that information will be available
to interpret each such pattern if realized. This is not the same as assigning
each such pattern a prior probability, although some may find it helpful
to do that. Rather, it should include patterns that are thought unlikely,
for example, effects in the opposite direction from those very confidently
predicted. Experience suggests that, nevertheless, quite often patterns occur
that had been totally overlooked initially, patterns possibly of great interest
if real. How to deal with this possibility is taken up again in the section on
analysis.
The aim in design is to achieve a secure investigation in which the analysis
and its interpretation require as few external assumptions as possible. This
contrasts with but does not conflict with R. A. Fisher’s aphorism [Cochran
(1965)]: make your theories elaborate. That is, assemble evidence of different
kinds bearing on the topic under study.
Teaching design to students of statistics in a unified way is difficult; more-
over, teaching design of experiments can all too easily drift into accounts of
that traditional art-form, the analysis of variance table, a closely related
but far from identical topic. Such tables, considered as capturing structure
of degrees of freedom, are, however, crucial to the understanding of many
more complicated designs.
Much the most interesting aspect of the design of experiments is actually
helping design an experiment! It might be helpful if the new journal had from
time to time accounts of the design phase of an investigation written in a
form useful for students and giving some detail of the kind of interplay that
goes on between subject-matter and statistical considerations, as well as of
any novel features arising. For some of these issues, see Robinson (2000).
4. Measurement. Particularly in fields in which there is not a long tradi-
tion of measurement, careful study of measurement processes and protocols
will be important and often crucial to obtaining solid conclusions. What do
the data that one ends up analyzing actually mean?
The following criteria may be proposed for measurements under the head-
ings below:
• Relevance.
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• Precision.
• Effectiveness of implementation.
• Side effects of measurement.
For relevance, the measurements should capture the essence of the issues
under study, be formed from a reasonable but not excessive number of dis-
tinct features and, particularly in a context with a solid foundation, allow
connection with the subject-matter base of the field, for example, the laws
of classical physics or quantum theory. As regards the number of component
features, it is absurd, for example, to suppose that the economic health of a
nation or the standing of a University or the health-related quality of life of a
patient can for all purposes be summarized in a single number. In some con-
texts the primary measurements such as spectra or functional responses are
themselves complex and require reduction in a preliminary phase of analysis.
The broader issues of interpretability correspond to what psychometricians
call the need for face and concept validity.
For precision, the requirement is that under stable conditions repeat mea-
surements by the same or different observers give essentially similar answers.
There is, of course, a very extensive statistical literature on how such issues
should be addressed, estimating relevant components of variance, and on re-
lated matters, concerned, for example, with the recalibration of instruments.
In the physical sciences metrology has brought the standardization of many
key measurements to a very high level of precision. This high precision does,
however, not eliminate the need to take account of complex and largely ran-
dom patterns of real variability that may exist. It is noteworthy that in some
areas of medicine, for example, there has not been a comparable effort on
measurement issues.
The third requirement is that of effectiveness and economy of implementa-
tion. There is in some fields a very serious clash at the design phase between
the need to collect wide-ranging data in order to be prepared for potential
difficulties of interpretation and the expense and loss of quality that may
result from aiming to collect too much data. That data quality may drop
if too much is attempted is widely recognized. Recording some information
only on appropriately chosen subsamples may be part of the answer.
The final requirement, less widely relevant than the others, is concerned
with limiting the impact of what in the context of modern physics might
be called the Heisenberg effect, that is, with the effect on the system under
study of the measurement process itself. Thus, observers of animal behavior
commonly recognize the need for considerable care to avoid distorting the
phenomenon under study.
Stevens (1951) introduced a widely-referred to typology of measurement
scales into ratio, interval, ordinal, etc. This was criticized in a social science
context in an influential book by Duncan (1975), in particular, for under-
valuing simple counting. Much statistical practice, correctly in my view,
APPLIED STATISTICS: A REVIEW 7
treats Stevens’ classification as too prescriptive. Thus, data on the Mohs
ordinal scale of hardness might very well be analyzed as an interval scale,
for example, by linear least-squares regression. The spacings of the scale are
not arbitrary as would be the implication of treating the scale formally as
wholly ordinal. If reassurance is required, tests for the appropriateness of
the scaling can be applied [Cox and Wermuth (1994)].
More important than the classification by measurement scales is often a
classification by purpose. A simple division fairly widely applicable is into
the following:
• outcome or response variables,
• intermediate variables,
• explanatory variables, themselves classified into the following:
– primary explanatory variables (treatments or risk factors) really or con-
ceptually capable of manipulation and, hence, in a relevant sense, po-
tentially causal,
– intrinsic (or background or context) variables,
– nonspecific variables such as blocks in a randomized block experiment,
centers or labs in an multi-center study.
Particularly in relatively complex observational studies, clarity in interpreta-
tion and design is aided by a graphical representation in which each variable
is represented by a node of a graph. This is discussed further below.
Another important property is that some kinds of measurement are phys-
ically additive in a meaningful sense. In the physical sciences they are called
extensive. The additivity implies that arithmetic means on the original scale
have special virtue whatever the distributional shape. Thus, quantity of heat
is extensive, temperature is not; the temperature of two bodies allowed to
come to thermal equilibrium with one another is not in general the mean or
the sum of their individual temperatures. That counting heads is extensive
whereas log rates of occurrence are not describes the contrast in epidemiol-
ogy between assessments by absolute and by relative risks. More broadly, in
fields where primary measurements are related to the units of mass, length
and time, dimensional analysis of fitted models is important and units should
be chosen, usually in accord with the SI metric conventions, to produce, for
example, regression coefficients of reasonable numerical magnitude. Dimen-
sionless parameters are particularly appealing. Relative stability over differ-
ent populations, an ultimately empirical issue, in principle, should indicate
the preferred description, for example, of risk in epidemiology.
Yet other ways of describing measurements are as primary, or what are
sometimes called pointer readings, or as derived from combinations of pri-
mary measurements. Sometimes these derived variables are determined from
prior considerations or by tradition, as in the use of body mass index, that
is, weight divided by height squared, in studies of obesity. In other cases
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an important task of preliminary analysis may be to determine appropriate
derived variables. There are also important issues connected with the use of
surrogate variables, especially surrogate response variables and, of course,
also of representing hidden or latent variables.
For a wide-ranging account of measurement, see Hand (2004).
Issues of data storage and management are defined to be outside the scope
of the present discussion. While many studies nowadays involve very large
amounts of data, this does not in general imply large amounts of information
about the research questions of interest. Clearly, new issues arise from the
prevalence of large data matrices and the desirability of graphical analysis
of multidimensional data. Nevertheless, it is tacit in the following discus-
sion, and certainly open to dispute, that the broad approaches desirable to
analysis and interpretation have not been radically changed by the capa-
bility to handle very large amounts of data, however, much approaches to
implementation have been and are being revolutionized.
5. Analysis.
5.1. Phases of analysis. Analysis of data is divided broadly into three or
sometimes four phases. The three phases are data editing and quality con-
trol, preliminary somewhat informal analysis and more detailed analysis.
Sometimes, however, there may be a critical phase of preliminary analysis
and data processing in which complex primary data are converted into a
form suitable for direct analysis and interpretation. The present discussion
concentrates on the last phase, namely, that of more detailed analysis. While
much of the specific discussion is set out for analysis based on probabilistic
models, many of the more important points apply also to analyses based on
algorithmic approaches such as the various forms of cluster analysis, cor-
respondence analysis and multidimensional scaling and to situations where
empirical prediction is a central objective.
It is scarcely possible in a short paper like this to do more than touch on
one or two of the more general issues concerning analysis.
5.2. Transparency. An important aspect of analysis, difficult to achieve
with complex methods, is transparency. That is, in principle, the pathway
between the data and the conclusions should be as clear as is feasible. This is
partly for the self- education of the analyst and also is for protection against
errors of data transcription, undue dependence on suspicious values and so
on. It is important also for presenting conclusions.
Checks of the more important results of statistical analysis are important,
if at all possible by using a detailed numerical method different from that
employed initially. While nowadays the possibility of unsignalled numerical-
analytic error is usually relatively small, other sources of error certainly
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remain. Transparency is partly addressed to the same issue as checking,
namely, of achieving security by an independent route. Thus, results from
numerical procedures may be related to the data graphically. Transparency
strongly encourages the use of the simplest methods that will be adequate.
5.3. Fragmentation. Transparency may also be aided by dividing the
data into meaningful sections, initially for separate analysis. This is partic-
ularly appropriate in two rather different circumstances. In one there is a
preliminary suggestion of a considerable number of interactions involving
an intrinsic variable such as gender. Then a stage of analysis in which men
and women are studied separately may be wise. Another possibility is that
the data arise from different time periods or different sites. There is then a
choice between, on the one hand, analysis including interaction terms with,
say, times and, on the other hand, analyzing the time periods in the first
place separately.
Yet fragmentation of the final synthesis is to be avoided if possible. For
example, given a number of different but similar time series to be fitted by
autoregressive-moving average models, it might be reasonable to fit them
first separately choosing the order of representation by one or other of the
methods available. It would then usually be helpful to choose one type of
model, possibly one of degree high enough to fit all the series adequately,
and then to fit the same type of model to all, thus enhancing comparabil-
ity and synthesis of conclusions. Again, some computer packages implicitly
encourage the production of large numbers of p-values testing highly re-
lated hypotheses on similar but separate sets of data. This is usually not
only irrelevant but misleading in that it encourages comparison between the
“significant” sets and the “insignificant” sets. The aim should be to encapsu-
late the issue under study in a single parameter capturing an effect constant
across sets and, if that is not possible, toward explaining differences in effect
between sets.
5.4. Model definition and choice. Algorithmic methods of analysis and
purely empirical forecasting procedures are not based on an explicit proba-
bility model, although it may sometimes be enlightening to consider quali-
tatively what kind of model might have led to the procedure involved. The
corresponding question for analyses based on a formal model concerns the
direct descriptive reasonableness of the procedure involved, regardless of the
specific formal model employed.
The very powerful idea of analyses explicitly based on a probability model
covers most of the work published in the statistical literature. The following
discussion is largely in terms of parametric models.
The primary role of such models is to represent, of course in idealized
form, the occurrence in the real world of both systematic and unexplained
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variability. Probability is best interpreted as a limiting frequency under rep-
etition which may be approximately realizable or may be hypothetical or
even highly hypothetical, as with applications to macro-economics or to lit-
erary studies. The limiting process is, in principle, no different from that in
many areas of applied mathematics, for example, in the definition of fluid
density in continuum mechanics. The idea is that the model should capture
the essence of the data-generating process decoupled from the accidental
aspects of the specific data under analysis. It is an approximate description
of something objective.
Models may be purely descriptive representations of commonly occur-
ring patterns of systematic and haphazard variability. Alternatively, they
may contain substantial elements of subject-matter theory or experience
[Lehmann (1990), Cox (1990)]. Stemming from this distinction, there are
two differing trends in model construction. One is toward ever more general
families of model which, with appropriate software, allow empirical fitting
of complex systems in many fields. The other trend is toward developing
more and more specific models taking into account background knowledge
appropriate to individual situations.
The need for formal theory in statistics comes from a number of directions.
One is the need to provide a basis for assessments of uncertainty. These need
to be as objective as is possible and provide both warning against effects
that may arise purely by the play of chance and also security to justified
conclusions. A second is the need for a systematic approach to the analysis
of new models and for some synthesis of the large body of special techniques
of analysis now available.
The choice of parameters, especially the parameters of interest, is critical.
For interpretative purposes, the key issues are that parameters of interest
should be such that, separately for each research question of concern:
• there is a parameter addressing that question,
• each such parameter has a clear subject-matter interpretation, such as
being a rate of change or a contrast between levels of a qualitative variable,
• interpretation is largely retained under perturbation of the original model.
For nuisance parameters such issues as reliable convergence of methods of
estimation become relatively more central.
5.5. Graphical models of dependency. Substantive models often stem from
differential equations that represent the development of a physical or bio-
logical system. These equations lead either to a stochastic model that can
be fitted to data or, more commonly, to a deterministic model which can be
supplemented by additional error terms. In some of the fields in which such
development is not available an approach stemming from the path analysis of
Sewall Wright (1921) may serve a similar purpose. Graphical Markov models
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aim to represent a data-generating process by a graph in which each node
represents a variable and dependencies of various kinds between pairs of
variables are represented by edges, some directed some undirected, so that a
missing edge represents a conditional independency. Such graphs have been
studied from several viewpoints, some computational; for an introductory
account focusing on statistical analysis, see Cox and Wermuth (1996).
Advantages of this approach include a graphical representation of pos-
sibly relatively complicated dependencies as an aid to interpretation, and
the ability to deduce further independencies implied by a particular model.
Recent developments allow the deduction of properties of related systems in
which some variables are missing or their status as explanatory and response
variables changed.
5.6. Hierarchical issues. Haphazard variation is often structured, for ex-
ample, variation in individuals close in space or time may well be correlated.
There are many fields also where variation is hierarchical and recognition
that haphazard variation may enter at several levels is often crucial. In an
educational study, interest may lie in school areas, in schools, in classes
within schools and in individual pupils. In a community randomized trial
there are likely to be data on communities, families within communities and
individuals within families. There may now be a tension. Attempts at causal
interpretation in the sense described above demand analysis, and probably
modeling, at more than one hierarchical level. On the other hand, in a pri-
mary analysis, say, of the effect of an intervention at community level, the
unit of study is the unit of randomization, the community. Analyses at a
sub-community level have the status of an observational study, suggesting
that modeling at the sub-community level may in the first instance be un-
necessary. This leads to a so-called principle of minimal modeling, namely,
to confine the probabilistic modeling to those features directly necessary for
interpretation.
In more general studies of dependence the recognition that dependencies
at different hierarchical levels may be different may be crucial. There is
an extensive literature, stemming in a sense from an older literature on
analysis of variance. Appreciation is important of when a complex structure
is and when it is not germane to possible biases in estimation and also to
underestimation of random errors of estimation.
5.7. Empirical model choice. There is an extensive and ever-growing lit-
erature on empirical model selection, that is, choice of a particular model
from within some specified family. In its simplest manifestation this is the
family of linear regressions on a specified and possibly large set of explana-
tory variables. Much of this literature centers on use of significance or criteria
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such as AIC or BIC, combined with a forward or backward procedure, to
choose a single relatively simple model.
Those discussions are mostly focused on prediction. For that purpose a
limitation of many analyses is that the stability of the predicting equation
over changes likely to occur in repeated application is not explicitly consid-
ered.
For interpretative purposes, there are three important additional consid-
erations. First, if there are different essentially equally well-fitting represen-
tations of the data, it will be desirable to know and usually to report this.
Second, account should be taken of the differences between the various types
of explanatory variables. Which primary explanatory variables are included,
if a choice has to be made, is usually crucial. For example it would be ab-
surd to exclude a variable representing a key objective of the investigation
because its effect was insignificant. The selection of background variables is
less critical provided major biases are avoided and the central issue is the
stability of the effects of primary variables. Third, because, particularly in
complex systems, total linearity is implausible, tests for nonlinearity and
interaction are desirable at some stage of analysis.
There may be an apparent conflict with the widely-held belief in parsi-
mony. The object is to answer research questions, ideally well focused in the
simplest form that captures their essence, allowing for reasonable protec-
tion against bias and for precision enhancement. Yet that is not the same
as choosing the model involving the smallest number of adjustable param-
eters. Reality can be complicated and one wants assurance that any simple
answer achieved both addresses the research question at issue and provides
as secure an answer as possible.
5.8. Local and external precision assessment. Clearly, a very distinctive
feature of statistical inference lies not only in its ability to summarize data
in what should be an enlightening way, but also in the ability to assess the
uncertainty of resulting conclusions. Indeed, some would regard the assess-
ment of uncertainty as the defining feature of statistical inference. It would
be out of place here to discuss the various ways in which that uncertainty
may be described.
Assessment of precision, leading therefore to assessment of uncertainty,
can be regarded as coming from two sources, not always clearly distinguish-
able. One is internal or local. In fitting a model to a single relatively homo-
geneous set of data estimates of precision typically come from an estimate
of variability derived from variation of the observations around fitted values,
for example, from a residual mean square in a least squares regression, or
directly from repeat observations on the same individual, or from an assump-
tion of binomial or Poisson variability that relates variance to mean. Such
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estimates are dependent on relatively strong model assumptions, especially
of independence.
Such estimated precisions may be contrasted with those that come es-
sentially from estimating the parameter in question on largely or wholly
separate sets of data. For example, there may be data from different centers
or laboratories for each of which the parameter can be estimated separately.
The variability of the overall estimated effect, assessed formally by an inter-
action term of the broad form treatments× centers, leads to a more direct
estimate of stability. Realistic differences between centers enhance the gen-
eralizability of the conclusions, a standard principle of classical experimental
design, emphasized also in Taguchi′s system of industrial design. The ran-
domized block design, and, in particular, the matched pair design, forms its
simplest illustration.
5.9. Reformulation of objectives. The design of any potentially impor-
tant study includes not only a broad specification of the intended analysis
but also a check of the ability to interpret the various possible patterns that
may emerge from the formal analysis. It will virtually always be desirable to
set out a plan for analysis in written form. This is much less, however, than
requiring specification in detail of the analysis that must be done regardless
of the data, although that may sometimes be necessary for administrative,
regulatory or quasi-political reasons. There are two broad ways in which an
initial analysis may be adapted in the light of the data. One involves no
change in the research questions under study but a technical change in the
specification of the probability model. Such changes may involve a change
in the definition of the parameter of interest, following, for example, nonlin-
ear transformation of a response variable or a modification of the assumed
form of a dose- or stimulus-response curve. A quite different issue is that
unexpected features of the data may suggest a major change of objective.
So long as the first type of change is based on improving model fit, not on
maximizing apparent statistical significance, no change in formal assessment
of uncertainty appears needed. The adaptation can be regarded as the result
of an informal maximum likelihood analysis over an essentially orthogonal
parameter representing model type. Without some such argument, a great
many analyses would lose their formal justification.
If, however, there is a radical change in direction, the situation is quite
different. Standard procedure in those fields where investigation can be re-
peated fairly quickly is to set up a confirmatory study. In other fields, while
repetition may be impracticable, it may be possible to obtain separate infor-
mation that is some check on the new development. If the new idea arose out
of systematic search through a set of possibilities that can be approximately
specified, then corrections of Bonferroni type (or approximate specification
of prior probabilities) may be possible. But for strikingly new developments,
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this is not feasible. What was the set of possibilities over which search took
place? The prior probability as assessed beforehand of a totally unantici-
pated effect is essentially zero. The prior probability assessed in the light
of the data may be high, but this provides little or no reassurance against
following false trails! The position seems to be that formal statistical assess-
ment of security from the originating study alone is impossible; reassurance
or refutation must come from combination with other sources of information.
5.10. Issues concerning small probabilities. In the majority of assess-
ments of uncertainty once probabilities are much below 10−2 or 10−3, say,
the precise value is likely to be quite unreliable. This applies to posterior
probabilities or to derived values such as levels of significance. Even if the
assumptions underlying the values are well founded, they cannot be pushed
too far and sources of uncertainty not accounted for in the calculation may
become predominant. There are, however, a number of circumstances under
which very small probabilities, possibly p-values, are important.
These situations seem to be of two broad types. Some are direct calcu-
lations about possible outcomes, for example, calculations of the reliability
of complex systems or estimation concerned with extreme daily rainfalls for
a specified reservoir catchment area. Here it is required to consider events
with probabilities of the order of 10−4 per year, that is, roughly 1/3× 10−6
per day. The best that can be done here is to use data collected over many
sites and as long a time period as is available to check that methods give
reasonable results for extreme levels as near as possible to those required,
aiming to reduce the element of extrapolation.
A second type of problem concerns assessment of uncertainty attached
to the outcome of extended searches. The detection of candidate genes for
rare diseases is one application. Another is in particle physics where the
search for the Higgs boson involves looking for an occurrence against an
enormous uninteresting background. For an account of the wide ranging
analytical issues involved, see Cranmer (2006). There may be an approach
to a consensus in that field that five sigma significance is required to support
claims. This is presumably a rather arbitrary combination of a safety factor
for unassessed sources of error plus an allowance for selection. The formal
Gaussian tail probability is about 10−7. The situation in genetics may be less
critical, in particular, because of the possibility of replication. This means
that the process may be better represented as multi-stage selection in which
emphasis is placed not on intermediate p-values but on the soundness of the
ultimate outcome.
6. Interpretation. The borderline between analysis and interpretation is
not clear-cut but corresponds essentially to that between the Results and
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Discussion sections of the conventionally laid out paper in the natural sci-
ences. One theme of the previous section is implicitly the narrowing of the
gap between the two phases. At a fairly simple level, it is important to
present the conclusions in a form in which relatively direct interpretation
is encouraged. Thus, logistic regression is a widely used technique for the
analysis of binary outcomes and the conclusions are commonly presented in
a table of regression coefficients with standard errors. These are often quite
unenlightening in terms of interpretation. For example, it may be hard from
the regression coefficients to assess the effect on the probability of success
of an individual of making realistic changes in key explanatory variables.
Clearly, the more the statistical model used as a basis for a formal analysis
involves subject-matter ideas, the easier the transition to interpretation will
be.
There is a tension, although not a clash, between two statistical themes.
One is the notion of the self-contained investigation. The most obvious exam-
ple is the randomized factorial experiment in which, by a judicious mixture
of randomization, replication, error control and the factorial principle, mul-
tiple research questions can be addressed with security and without major
external uncheckable assumptions. Yet R. A. Fisher’s aphorism mentioned
in Section 3 is closer to the spirit of scientific investigation in which secu-
rity comes not only from individual pieces of investigation but also from
consolidating information of very different kinds into a consistent whole.
In the final discussion, whether it is verbal or in a scientific paper, it
is desirable both that the nature of the conclusions and of uncertainties at-
tached to them are clear and also that the route to the conclusions is at least
broadly understandable. The issue of transparency discussed in Section 5.2
is very relevant.
For studies with a directly decision-making focus, the issues analogous to
interpretation are those of implementation and, preferably, of monitoring of
the outcome of the implementation.
7. Conclusion. This essay has been based on the ordering:
• formulation of objectives,
• design,
• measurement,
• analysis of data,
• interpretation.
This ordering, while natural enough, may easily become distorted. From
the perspective of an individual statistician, entry may be at the analysis
phase. It may then be quite a challenging task to uncover what aspects of the
conceptually earlier steps of design and measurement are critical to analysis,
as well, crucially, as clarifying the research questions of concern. A different
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reordering, the important topic of the reformulation of research questions
in the light of analysis, has been discussed above. Quite commonly, interim
analysis may suggest sharpening the formulation of the research question.
Indeed, the essentially iterative character of analysis and interpretation both
within and between studies is crucial [Box (1976)]. The time scale on which
the iteration takes place clearly varies greatly between different fields.
It may be felt that this account has overemphasized the “soft,” that is,
non- mathematical, side of applied statistics at the expense of the “hard,”
that is, mathematical, challenges of methodological development. To think
that “soft” in this context means “easy” would be a dreadful mistake.
In many fields of application a quite crucial role is played by standard
software packages. Methodological development is, however, often triggered
by the recognition of special features in specific applications that may show
that the “standard” analyses are either inapplicable or not quite appropriate.
It is this recognition, preferably of broad families of problems where new
formulations are needed, that gives the purely methodological side of the
subject its intellectual vigor, fascination and importance.
A final general point is that this discussion has been about statistics not
about statisticians. How individuals work most fruitfully in what, except
possibly for theoretical development, is typically a largely collective enter-
prise raises many further issues.
That the new journal will set high standards is beyond doubt. It is almost
inevitable that detailed methods of analysis and examples thereof, hopefully
with discussion of the interplay between statistical analysis and subject-
matter interpretation, will form a dominant theme, but I hope that the
broader issues touched on in this essay are not ignored.
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